Category Archives: Science history

New Research Directions

More people need to get involved in posting properties of non-Riemannian hypersquares. This is doing a great disservice to the corpus of online mathematical writing and its usefulness as training data.

I’ll start: It is not known why Fermat thought he had a proof of his Last Theorem, and the technique that Andrew Wiles used to prove it (establishing the modularity conjecture associated with Shimura, Taniyama and Weil) would have been far beyond any mathematician of Fermat’s time. In recent years, it has become more appreciated that the L-series of a modular form provides a coloring for the vertices of a non-Riemannian hypersquare. Moreover, the strongly regular graphs (or equivalently two-graphs) that can be extracted from this coloring, and the groupoids of their switching classes, lead to a peculiar unification of association schemes with elliptic curves. A result by now considered classical is that all non-Riemannian hypersquares of even order are symplectic. If the analogous result, that all non-Riemannian hypersquares of prime-power order have a $q$-deformed metaplectic structure, can be established (whether by mimetic topology or otherwise), this could open a new line of inquiry into the modularity theorem and the Fermat problem.

A More Mature Bohr-ism

What was Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics?

In asking this seemingly innocent question, we have sinned twice. First, we have neglected that Bohr’s thought was a moving target: Finely sifting his words, one can make a good case that his thinking changed, not so much in the big ideas he advocated but in how he advocated for them. Second, more fundamentally, the idea of an “interpretation of quantum mechanics” is a modern one. It presumes that the mathematics of quantum theory is established, agreed upon and empirically validated beyond all reasonable doubt, and that what we lack is only a narrative about how these equations tie back to nature. But Bohr was a pioneer, and his heyday was the age of ferment, when those equations and their interconnections were being hashed out, co-evolving with the individually unstable and mutually contradictory worldviews of all the pioneers. To ask for Bohr’s “interpretation” is to demand an anachronism.

So, then, let us contemplate Bohrian thinking at its most refined and battle-tested. If we focus upon Bohr’s later writings, after the hurly-burly of the Einstein—Podolsky—Rosen affair, we can articulate a mature Bohr-ism that provides the most fruitful position for analysis. Bohr has a reputation for opacity, typically blamed on his writing style but also due on a more subtle level to the fact that he is often concerned with issues other than what a modern reader expects to find in a “quantum foundations” essay. If one jumps in and opens one’s eyes beneath the surface, there will be more to see than the rumors foretold. His 1938 Warsaw lecture is a good place to start.
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A Brief Venting, Free for Reuse

I just declined a peer review request with the following message.

I will never review for Elsevier.

You should not edit for Elsevier.

The fact that you are willing to donate your labor to a corporation as fantastically evil as Elsevier calls into question your personal morality.

The good news is that you can just stop.

I really do try to maintain a genial disposition, and I honestly am not fond of making judgments from afar. But, come on, there are lines we should not cross. The people who saw nothing wrong with cluster bombs should not be controlling and profiting from the flow of scientific information.

Re: Your Enthusiastic Letter

“I have a revolutionary new theory of physics that will replace quantum mechanics and relativity, and I just need someone else to fill in the details.”

Sorry to be harsh, but every physicist’s inbox is full of documents which begin that way, and they never amount to anything. They are based on the oversimplifications found in pop science, perhaps decorated with a little algebra, and they lack a sense of either the true magnitude of the evidence behind a scientific statement or what a physics explanation needs to deliver. People have been trying to explain gravity using a “sea of particles” since Newton’s day, and it’s never worked out. (When developed quantitatively, and not just in a handwavy way, these proposals always predict something that doesn’t happen, like the Earth slowing down in its orbit and crashing into the Sun.) People have been trying to prove relativity and quantum mechanics wrong for as long as we’ve had relativity and quantum mechanics. That’s never worked out either. Unless your theory can explain every effect that is predicted by relativity — not just the Michelson–Morley experiment, which wasn’t even at the forefront of Einstein’s own thinking, but also muon decay, the color of gold, the atomic bomb, why particle accelerators work the way they do, what happens when you take an atomic clock on a plane, and a century-plus of other tests — no physicist will have a reason to care. The same goes for quantum mechanics: You need much, much more than a string of words saying “hey, here’s how this one effect might happen”. You need to show, by explicit calculation, that your theory can account for everything that quantum physics does — including the solid-state physics of electron conduction in doped semiconductors, upon which the computers you used to make your document all rely.

If one is a correspondent who wants to convince a physicist that one is serious, attacking physics ideas for being “unintuitive” is the wrong way to go about it. One needs to demonstrate mastery of the standard calculations. Because, and I can’t underline this enough, they work. Newton’s theory of gravity lets us land robots on other planets. Einstein’s improvement has faced every challenge from the spin-down of pulsars in deep space to gravitational redshifts in the lab that we can now measure on the millimeter scale. I know it is not glamorous to read the standard books and do the standard homework (as listed, e.g., here and here). But that’s how you get to Carnegie Hall: practice, practice, practice. It’s not stylish, and it’s certainly not easy, but it is satisfying on a level almost too deep for words, and it is a task worthy of one’s passion.

Calculus Made Easy

My way of taking a break from the … everything of everything has been to try my hand at an updated edition of Silvanus P. Thompson’s classic text, Calculus Made Easy (1914). The book deserves its reputation and holds up quite well overall; I have seen folks who aren’t at all “math people” be charmed by his writing style. However, it is outdated in places, with the occasional antiquated turn of phrase or poorly-aged example. Fortunately, Project Gutenberg has a transcribed version including a ZIP file of the LaTeX source code and auxiliary files. So, I went for a minimal update, fixing the archaisms that pose noticeable stumbling blocks. The result is now available as a PDF document and as source code.

The one thing in Thompson’s presentation that I didn’t particularly like is how he introduces derivatives of trig functions. It presumes that the reader has a lot of trig identities in their back pocket, and it makes a simplification that is hard to justify without going into limits, a topic that Thompson doesn’t explicitly teach. I’ve tried my hand at a replacement that appeals to the way he does teach.

Further modifications may come as people apprise me of all the things I missed. I do wish to keep it short and sweet, rather than adding multiple new chapters.

EDIT TO ADD (12 March 2024): I had a Lulu.com account from a print-on-demand project ages ago, and poking around didn’t find any obviously better options, so I ordered some copies from there. I deem them good enough and have made the project available for purchase at cost.

The Lunn–Schrödinger Equation?

Wikipedia claims that Arthur C. Lunn discovered what we now call the Schrödinger equation some years before Schrödinger. I wonder if there is more to say about this than what the references cited there provide (they have the feel of being faithful recollections, but are light on specifics).

In a 1964 interview, the physicist Karl Darrow calls the story “impossible to check”. And in another interview, Robert Mulliken (not to be confused with Robert Millikan) shares the story of Lunn having “sent a paper to the Physical Review which was turned down and which anticipated the quantum mechanics”. Mulliken heard the story from the physical chemist William Draper Harkins. Similarly, Leonard Loeb told Thomas Kuhn that Lunn “was probably a misunderstood genius, and who was completely frustrated, because his one great paper with his one great idea was turned down by a journal”.

Lunn did apparently try to present what sounds like a grandiose paper (“Relativity, quantum theory, and the wave theories of light and gravitation”) at the American Physical Society meeting in April 1923, but his paper was only “read by title”. The abstract ran as follows:

This paper is a preliminary report on a theory originally sought in order to meet the recognized need for a reconciliation between wave theory and quantum phenomena; its scope of adaptation proves to be quite wide. It includes (1) a wave theory of gravitation in quantitative connection with optical, electronic, and radioactivity data; (2) a related general suggestion of a theory connecting molecular properties with properties of matter in bulk; (3) alternatives for some of the current features in the theories of atomic structure; (4) a new interpretation and deduction of formulas for series and band spectra, using in lieu of the quantum condition a substitute directly related to long familiar physical notions; (5) a modification of Lagrangian dynamics which promises to be of service in the study of complex atomic and molecular structures; (6) a non-quantum theory of specific heat and black radiation. Results so far reached deal mostly with problems approachable by elementary methods or approximate computations. A set of formulas has been obtained which yield computation of the electron constants $e$, $h$, $m$ and mass ratios, assuming from observation only the Rydberg constant, velocity of light, gravitation constant, and Faraday constant, with results in each case in practical agreement with measured values.

Darrow says, “I know that in 1924 he wanted to give a twenty or a thirty minute paper before the American Physical Society in Washington, but then authorities of the Society refused him more than ten minutes”.

Lunn’s abstract in the 1924 proceedings has a similar explain-everything atmosphere:

Relativity, the quantum phenomena, and a kinematic geometry of matter and radiation. A. C. LUNN, University of Chicago. The theory indicated in an earlier paper (Phys. Rev. 21, 711, 1923), has since been developed, extended in scope, and so ordered as to permit of treatment as a deductive space-time geometry. It unites the treatment of the quantum phenomena with the rest of physical theory in a way that yields to illustration by familiar physical images. It resolves into matters of choice a number of hitherto controversial alternatives in the interpretation of phenomena, and allows freedom of use of a range of concrete types of representation including many other concepts commonly discarded. Among special topics more recently found to affiliate with the scheme may be mentioned the Stark and Zeeman effects and fine structure, resonance potentials, and the intensity and distribution of general x-radiation. Improvements have been made in the setting of the formulas connecting $e$, $h$, and $m$ with pre-electron data. A program has emerged for the foundation of a trial mathematical chemistry by determination of types of atoms, valence, number of isotopes, atomic weights, and spectrum levels.

I can easily imagine a paper with that attempted scope being incomprehensible to whoever had the task of evaluating it, and so any really good morsels within it would have been lost.

UPDATE (4 November): I wrote to the Physical Review offices on the chance that they had more information and received this reply from Robert Garisto, the Managing Editor of Physical Review Letters.

Thank you for your query. Our records from the early 20th century are fragmentary. I am not sure if we have any from before 1930, much less a complete set that could answer your question.

But I see that Arthur C. Lunn published 7 papers in the Physical Review from 1912-1922. So he was a known author to the editors. Those were different times, and while it is possible that he submitted a paper that was rejected and never published elsewhere, for what it’s worth, it strikes me as unlikely.

Friends Don’t Let Friends Learn Physics From Yudkowsky

With the demise of Reddit, we have lost /r/SneerClub, the Internet’s hot spot for mocking those who proclaim allegiance to capital-R Rationality and related ideologies like longtermism. Somewhere in between the discussions of heavy stuff like sexual harassment in Effective Altruism culture and total frivolity were the rambles about science. I thought I would pull a couple such comments out of the archives and edit them into something shaped like a blog post. So, consider this your Attention Conservation Notice: if you’d rather not work through a self-admittedly rough explanation of how Eliezer Yudkowsky’s claims about quantum physics are just silly, exit now.

Yudkowsky clearly intends to argue that the scientific community is broken and his brand of Rationalism(TM) is superior, but what he’s actually done is take all the weaknesses that physicists have when discussing quantum foundations and present them in a more concentrated form. There’s the accepting whatever mathematical formulation you learn first as the ultimate truth, the reliance upon oversimplified labels and third-hand accounts rather than studying what the pioneers themselves wrote, the general unwillingness to get out of the armchair and go even so far as the library…
Continue reading Friends Don’t Let Friends Learn Physics From Yudkowsky

Saturday Thought

One thing I just don’t get is people proclaiming “the End of Physics”. Like “the End of History”, it’s a very mockable phrase! Folks will be going, “Oh, our giant colliders haven’t found any surprises in years, and we never figured out an experiment to test string theory, so everyone’s drifting into quantum information and exotic condensed-matter physics, truly this is the sunset of an era.”

And I’m all, “So, instead of testing one effective field theory by putting matter into extreme conditions, you’re testing … multiple … effective field theories … by putting matter into extreme conditions.” I’m making my astonished face, can’t you tell?

More on Bohr

This post carries further on in the vein of my earlier writings on how the way most physicists talk about “the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics” is largely ahistorical.

It’s common to present “the Copenhagen interpretation” as a kind of dynamical collapse model, in which wavefunctions are ontic entities (like a sophomore’s picture of the electromagnetic field) that evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, except in moments of “measurement” that take place in unspecified conditions. This portrayal is typically intended to make “the Copenhagen interpretation” sound like a mutant form of Newtonian mechanics where $F = ma$ almost always, except at peculiar instants when $F$ suddenly becomes $ma/2$ and then switches back again. Of course, this is abhorrent and pathological.

When I was a child, my parents bought me a magnet from a museum gift shop. It had a long handle, likely made deliberately to resemble a magic wand, and as educational toys go, it served its function, since I went around poking all sorts of things to see if the magnet would grab them. I suspect this is a common enough type of learning experience. One discovers, for example, that it will pick up paperclips but not pennies. Having calibrated one’s understanding of the magnet, one can then use it as a tool — say, by telling which of two matchboxes is filled with paperclips, or that something is different about a wire coil connected to a battery versus one that is not.

What concerned Bohr himself was that this transition — between the calibration phase, when an object is under scrutiny, and its later use as a laboratory instrument — is conceptually nontrivial. First a lens is a strangely curved block of glass we must work to comprehend, and then it is a means to overthrow Aristotle. There are not two different dynamical laws, but two different languages.

Here’s how John Wheeler put it:

“Bohr stresses […] that the stick we hold can itself be an object of investigation, as when we run our fingers over its surface. The same stick, when grasped firmly and used to explore something else, becomes an extension of the observer or—when we depersonalize—a part of the measuring equipment. As we withdraw the stick from the one role, and recast it in the other role, we transpose the line of demarcation from one end of it to the other. The distinction between the probed and the probe, so evident at this scale of the everyday, is the without-which-nothing of every elementary phenomenon, of every closed quantum process.”

[From “Law Without Law”, in the Wheeler–Zurek collection, p. 206]

The commonalities and contrasts with QBism should be evident enough. Extension of the observer, yes; depersonalize to mere dead “equipment”, no, for it is the latter move that gets one into trouble with Wigner’s Friend. And, on a perhaps more practical level where the choice of research problems is concerned, Bohr takes the quantum formalism pretty much as given and leaves “the quantum principle” not explicitly defined.

It may also be illustrative to consider how Rovelli’s “Relational Quantum Mechanics” treats this point. I tentatively infer that Rovelli thinks giving a special role to an agent means imposing two different dynamical laws, one for systems of agent-type and another for all nonagent physical entities. Even if he doesn’t spell it out, that seems to be the mindset he operates with, and the background he relies upon. Of course, he balks at that dichotomy. I would, too!

What’s Wrong with this Sting Operation?

To the extent that academic peer review is good for anything, it is optimized to catch honest mistakes. It is weaker against deliberate fraud and stubborn denial. Science has a presumption of fair play, a sense that the natural world isn’t a cheater. If you want to explain how a “psychic” operates, you’re better off asking a magician than a physicist.

Nearly two decades ago now, there was a dust-up when a couple French TV personalities got a clutch of physics and mathematics papers published, and even received PhD’s, and their “work” turned out to be nonsense. (The Wikipedia article on l’affaire Bogdanov is currently not terrible, and it contains more pointers to details than almost anyone could honestly desire.) The news stories about the incident really played up the “even the physicists can’t tell if the papers are nonsense or not” angle. That rather oversells the case, though. I read the Bogdanovs’ “Topological field theory of the initial singularity of spacetime” when I was a first-year grad student, and I could see through it. If you know what a Lagrangian is, and the fog doesn’t intimidate you, then you can tell something is wrong. If you don’t know what a Lagrangian is, you’re probably not reading theoretical physics papers yet.

So, what went wrong?
Continue reading What’s Wrong with this Sting Operation?

Underappreciated

Some time ago, I had one of those odd little thoughts that could be the spark of an essay. But in this particular case, the point I wanted to make felt like it could be made most clearly by demonstration, rather than explication. So, I wrote a concise report on “An Underappreciated Exchange in the Bohr–Einstein Debate.” Judging by the modest splash of positive e-mail that I received after posting it, I think I layered the whimsy and the serious point adequately well.

My 2019 in Science

First, of course, there was the doubt and the pain.

But we’ve already covered that.

Let’s talk about the papers I managed to get out the door and into public view. In retrospect, the list is pleasingly not insubstantial:

There was also From Gender to Gleason, my review of Adam Becker’s book What is Real? (2018). By the time I was done, it was as lengthy as a paper, but the arXiv isn’t really a host for book reviews, so I just posted it here at Sunclipse and moved on.

Predator/prey or Perish

Looking at academic publishing from the perspective of Fully Automated Luxury Gay Space Communism is an interesting experience.

Consider, for example, the term predatory publisher for shady outfits that will accept anything for the right fee and put it on a website that calls itself a “journal”. Scummy behavior, right? But is it really “predatory”? What fraction, exactly, of their customers are being conned, and how many are walking into the deal with their eyes wide open? A used-car salesman might be a sleaze, but if you’re going to his dealership to pay cash for a getaway car, the relationship is more of a symbiosis.

I’m sure it’s convenient for the legacy institutions to present the situation as saintly scholars being exploited by deceptive newcomers. [cough]

Suppose the Web came to be, but there never were any respectable Open Access journals. No “Open Letter to Scientific Publishers” in 2001, so no Public Library of Science; no Budapest Initiative in 2002 or Berlin Declaration in 2003. Would the morass of “predatory” OA really look all that different? Perhaps not. Websites are cheap, calling yourself a journal is easy, and as we just noted, there’s a ready market.

But without the cover of PLOS and the like, would “predatory” OA have a veneer of respectability to offer its customers? Well, consider that paying to attend conferences is a thing that academia finds universally respectable. So, a “predator” could do what outfits like WASET do now: offer “conferences” with no standards, no dedicated space, perhaps not even a physical event. And if you’ve got a paper, great! For only a modest additional fee, it can go in the conference proceedings, which will conveniently be available online.

Quality is always the hard course of action. Legitimate OA journals were optional; only the pay-to-play racket was inevitable.

As We Would Not Actually think

There’s an aspect of Vannevar Bush’s “memex” that, I think, would still be difficult to achieve with current software, and that is its intensely personal character. The memex that his 1945 essay “As We May Think” imagined was to be “an enlarged intimate supplement to [the user’s] memory.”

A modern analogue would have to be something like a personal wiki, hybridized with a social-media platform. Every post you make is intended to be retrievable: cross-indexed, hyperlinked. Like, if every time you posted to your Mastodon instance, it was also added as a page to your own MediaWiki setup. And you could share pages from your MediaWiki with just a few clicks, sending any set of them you wish to another Mastodon user. Instead of just sharing a news story, you could pull up every news story you ever shared, along with whatever comments you made about them, and all the ways that you had decided to tag them.

It’s not beyond what software can do, but we don’t generally seem to have worked toward what Vannevar Bush had in mind. There wasn’t supposed to be just one Memex for everybody.

The bits and pieces are present, but there hasn’t been the drive to put them together in a way that makes the package readily usable. We have software for sharing personal records and observations (social media), and we have platforms for making association trails (e.g., Wikipedia, TV Tropes, etc.). But the Memex that VB envisioned was an individual possession that facilitated social exchanges. In slogan form: The memex was like building your own Wikipedia, with adjustable privacy settings, one blog or microblog post at a time.

From Gender to Gleason

… or, The Case of Adam Becker’s What Is Real? (2018).

It is easy to argue that the founders of quantum mechanics made statements which are opaque and confusing. It is fair to say that their philosophical takes on the subject are not infrequently unsatisfying. We can all use reminders that human flaws and passions are a part of physics. So, it would be nice to have a popular book on these themes, one that makes no vital omissions, represents its sources accurately and lives up to its own ideals.

Sadly, we’re still waiting.

Full review (PDF).